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Case No. 20090279-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Appellant/ Cross-Appellee,
vs.

James Benjamin White,
Appellee/ Cross-Appellant.

State's Reply Brief
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURTS COMPETENCY RULING IS NOT BEFORE
THIS COURT
Defendant first claims that the State cannot appeal from the trial court's initial
competency ruling because there is no "pending prosecution/' Aplee. Br. 6-7. As
noted in the State's opening brief, however, the State is not challenging the trial
court's conclusion that Defendant is incompetent. Instead, the State is challenging
only the court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice without first complying
with the statutorily mandated competency restoration process. Aplt. Br. 1-10. This
Court accordingly need not address Defendant's arguments on this issue.
In addition, though the competency ruling is not addressed in Defendant's
brief itself, the State notes that defense counsel has attached a pro se brief on that

point as an addendum to his brief. See Aplee. Br. 6 n.l; Aplee. Br., addendum D.
On March 2, 2010, however, this Court issued an order specifically denying
Defendant's request to file both a pro se brief and a brief from counsel. Addendum
A. This Court instead directed defense counsel to either include Defendant's
arguments about the competency ruling in the brief itself, or instead file an Anders
brief. Defense counsel has done neither.
"Pursuant to Rule 24(f), addenda are limited to relevant rules, statutes,
regulations, or copies of parts of the record. Addenda should not be used to
provide more argument in support of a party's position." State v. Harry, 873 P.2d
1149,1157 n.15 (Utah App. 1994). Thus, it "is improper to use an addendum to
incorporate argument by reference that should be included in the body of the brief."
Harris v. IES Assocs. Inc., 2003 UT App 112,139,69 P.3d 297 (quotations and citation
omitted); accord Aspenwood LLC v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT App 28, €H 43-45,73 P.3d
947.
Absent an order from this Court, the State therefore will not respond to the
arguments that Defendant has only made in his addendum.1

1

Given Defendant's failure to directly address the competency evaluation in
his brief, it does not appear that he has properly raised any new issue as crossappellant. The State accordingly treats this brief as a reply brief only.
2

II.
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS WERE PRESERVED
Defendant next claims that the State did not preserve its argument that the
trial court erred in dismissing the charges before initiating competency restoration
proceedings. Aplee. Br. 7-9. Defendant advances two claims in support of this
position. First, he argues that the State's motion to alter or amend judgment was not
properly filed under rule 59 because there was no trial. Aplee. Br. 8. Second, he
characterizes the State's motion as a motion to reconsider, and he then argues that
motions to reconsider do not preserve claims for appeal. Aplee. Br. 9.
First, Defendant argues that "Rule 59 is a post-trial rule of procedure that has
nothing to do with [a] pre-trial order of dismissal/' Aplee. Br. 8. But this Court has
rejected that interpretation of rule 59. In Interstate Land Cory), v. Patterson, 797 P.2d
1101,1105 (Utah App. 1990), the trial court had similarly "reasoned that a rule 59(a)
motion was only intended to follow a full evidentiary trial/' and it had therefore
concluded that a party could not file a rule 59(a) motion after a grant of summary
judgment. This Court reversed, holding that" [r]ule 59 is broad enough to include a
rehearing of any matter decided by the court without a jury." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). The supreme court recently followed this interpretation in

3

Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, f If 49-51, 654 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, wherein it
considered a party's rule 59 challenge filed after a grant of summary judgment.
Thus, Defendant is incorrect when he claims that rule 59 cannot be invoked in
cases where the dismissal was entered prior to trial.
Second, Defendant is also incorrect when he recharacterizes the State's rule
59 motion as a motion to reconsider. Aplt. Br. 9. Under rule 59(a)(7), a party can file
a motion for a new trial or for an amended judgment where the prior ruling was the
result of an "error in law." This is precisely what occurred here. As explained more
fully in the State's opening brief, the trial court first complied with the competency
evaluation statute and found Defendant to be incompetent to stand trial. R. 1046.
After issuing that ruling, however, the court then decided to dismiss the case with
prejudice — and it did so without the benefit of competency restoration efforts, or
even any argument on the propriety of dismissal from any party. R. 1046-48; 1142:
54-57. Following that sua sponte dismissal order, the State filed a motion requesting
that the court first comply with the statutorily-mandated competency restoration
process, arguing for the first time that the court's failure to do so was legal error.
Thus, this motion was not a motion to reconsider at all, but instead fit squarely

4

within the ambit of rule 59(a)(7). Defendant's argument to the contrary should
accordingly be rejected.2
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
DISREGARD THE MANDATORY COMPETENCY
RESTORATION PROCESS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 77-15-6
As set forth in the State's opening brief, two statutes are relevant for purposes
of this appeal. Aplt. Br. 6-10. First, Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-5 (West 2008) (the
competency evaluation statute) sets forth the process by which a trial court
evaluates a defendant's competency to stand trial. Second, Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-15-6 (West 2008) (the competency restoration statute) then sets forth the process
by which either (1) an incompetent defendant is restored to competency and

2

Defendant's reliance on Gilette v. Price, 2006 UT 24,135 P.3d 861, is similarly
misplaced. Aplee. Br. 9. The issue in Gilette was whether a motion to reconsider
tolled the time for filing an appeal. See generally Gilette, 2006 UT 24, ^[f 6-11. After
concluding that there is no basis in the rules to file a motion to reconsider, the
supreme court concluded that such motions cannot toll the time for filing an appeal.
Id. Here, however, the State has not requested extra time to file its notice of appeal.
The trial court issued its original competency ruling on March 23,2009, it ruled on
the State's rule 59(a) motion on April 14,2009, and the State filed its notice of appeal
on April 21, 2009. R. 1046, 1123-28, 1129-30. Thus, the State's notice of appeal
would have been timely whether it was filed in response to the original competency
ruling or the ruling on the motion to amend or alter the judgment. But more
importantly, the State's motion was not a motion to reconsider. Thus, Gilette does
not bar this appeal.
5

brought to trial, or (2) the charges are dismissed due to the State's inability to restore
the defendant's competency.
The trial court followed the procedures outlined in the competency evaluation
statute and concluded that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The State has
not challenged that ruling, but has instead challenged only the trial court's dismissal
of the charges without first complying with the competency restoration statute.
In his brief, Defendant advances two arguments in support of the trial court's
failure to comply with that statute. First, he argues that the trial court's decision
was authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-6(1). Second, he argues that even
if the trial court did err, the error was harmless. Both arguments should be rejected.
A. The trial court did not have the authority to disregard the
competency restoration process.
Defendant argues that the trial court's decision was correct under § 77-15-6(1).
Aplee. Br. 20. Section 77-15-6(1) states:
Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found
to be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant
committed to the custody of the executive director of the Department
of Human Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment
intended to restore the defendant to competency. The court may
recommend but not order placement of the defendant. The court may,
however, order that the defendant be placed in a secure setting rather
than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee shall designate
the specific placement of the defendant during the period of evaluation
and treatment to restore competency.
6

(Emphases added).
Defendant argues that this section authorized the trial court to skip the
competency restoration process on two levels.
First, Defendant suggests that by allowing the trial court to "recommend but
not order placement of the defendant/' section 77-15-6(1) actually allowed the trial
court to disregard the competency restoration process entirely. Aplee. Br. 20.
Defendant misunderstands the meaning of the word "placement" as used in
the statute. Contrary to Defendant's claim, that sentence does not give a court
discretion to disregard the competency restoration process. Rather, it refers only to
the court's ability—or lack thereof—to decide which mental health facility a
defendant will be treated in, instead placing that decision solely within the
discretion of the Department of Human Services. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1). But
this limiting provision contains no language authorizing a trial court to disregard
the separate statutory command that Defendant be placed in the custody of DHS.
Second, Defendant claims that § 77-15-6(l)'s reference to "Subsection (5)" also
authorizes a trial court to disregard the competency restoration process. Aplee. Br.
20-21. Specifically, Defendant claims that this provision refers to § 77-15-5, and he
then suggests that the trial court can disregard the competency restoration process

7

under § 77-15-5(14). Aplee. Br. 20-21. But Defendant misreads the statute. The plain
language of the statute refers to "Subsection (5)"-i.e. § 77-15-6(5)-not § 77-15-5,
which is another statutory section altogether. Given this, Defendant's argument
regarding § 77-15-5(14) has no bearing on the proper interpretation of § 77-15-6(1).3
In short, the statute plainly required the trial court to commit Defendant to
DHS's custody for competency restoration. It did not do so. This was error.
B. The error was not harmless.
Defendant next argues that even if the trial court failed to comply with the
competency restoration statute, the error was harmless because "the State has not
shown the likelihood of a different outcome had such a 90 day period taken place."
Aplee Br. 22. Defendant further argues that the error was harmless because the trial
judge was already convinced that Defendant could not be restored to competency.
Aplee. Br. 22.
As explained above, however, the statute expressly required the trial court to
initiate competency restoration proceedings. As part of that statutorily-mandated
3

In any event, even if § 77-15-6(l)'s reference to "Subsection (5)" incorporates
§ 77-15-5(14), Defendant's argument still fails on its own terms. Section 77-15-5(14)
allows a court to issue "reasonable order[s] to insure compliance with this section."
(Emphasis added). But the statute says nothing about also allowing a court to issue
orders that disregard the section's mandates as well. Defendant's interpretation
thus turns the statute on its head, ultimately converting an enforcement provision
into an avoidance provision. That approach is not supported by the statute.
8

process, Defendant would have been evaluated and treated by mental health
experts, and those experts would have then advised the trial court of Defendant's
progress before the court made any decision regarding dismissal of the case. See
generally Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(2)-(4).
This process ultimately protects interests on both sides of the adversarial
system. It protects the State from being deprived of the opportunity to prosecute
criminals on competency grounds, unless the trial court first received expert
analysis to guide this decision.

And this process also protects citizens like

Defendant, who insists that he is innocent of the charged crime and wants
vindication at trial, rather than receiving a dismissal via a competency ruling that
still leaves his guilt in question. See generally Aplee. Br., addendum D.
To protect these interests, this statute does not allow a trial judge to
unilaterally decide that a person who has been charged with a crime cannot be
restored to competence. Instead, the statute only allows the judge to make that
decision after receiving input from mental health experts who have examined and
treated the defendant for that very purpose.
Unless and until those mental health experts are given that opportunity in this
case, the trial court's opinion about the likely result of that treatment is, at best,
speculative —both in terms of what treatments DHS might offer Defendant during
9

those 90 days, and also in terms of Defendant's possible response to that treatment.
The trial court simply did not know whether Defendant would be amenable to
treatment, because Defendant has not yet been treated for this purpose. The trial
court's decision thus short-circuited a statutorily-mandated process, and it was not
harmless error. 4

rv.
DEFENDANT'S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED
Finally, Defendant asks this Court to affirm the dismissal of this prosecution
on alternate grounds that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.
Aplee. Br. 14-19. This claim should be rejected for two reasons.
First, Defendant's reliance on the alternate grounds doctrine is misplaced.
Under that doctrine, "an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Bailey v.
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, % 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quotations and citation omitted). This
4

Defendant's reference to the possibility of civil commitment proceedings as an
alternate remedy is unavailing. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the State's
purpose in this process is not limited to simply "treating or committing" Defendant.
Aplee. Br. 24. Rather, the State's purpose is to criminally prosecute Defendant for
chronically failing to pay his child support. Given the trial court's competency
ruling, the State can do that only if Defendant is restored to competency. The
statutory scheme plainly allows the State to make that attempt before losing its
opportunity to prosecute him— regardless of what may also occur in the civil
context.
10

doctrine is "available only in limited circumstances/' however, and is "certainly
limited to affirming decisions on alternate grounds and does not give appellate
courts permission to search the record for alternate grounds to reverse a decision."
Id. at Tf 13 n.3 (emphasis in original). When reviewing alternate grounds for
affirmance, appellate courts are "limited to the findings of fact made by the trial
court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of a new legal
theory or alternate ground." Id. at | 20; accord Angel Invs., LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT
40, f 38, 216 P.3d 944.
Here, Defendant asks this Court to affirm the trial court's dismissal on the
alternate grounds that his speedy trial rights were violated. But Defendant filed
several motions to dismiss based on alleged violation of his speedy trial rights, see,
e.g., R. 270-73, 315-30, 607-51, and the trial rejected each of those motions. R. 450,
652, 749-50. In one such ruling, the trial court specifically found that "during the
time period of 2006 through 2008, every continuance and delay in bringing this
matter to trial can be attributed to Defendant." R. 750. And in another discussion of
these issues, the court further concluded that "except for this competency issue,
every single one" of the delays in this case was caused by Defendant. R. 1141:15.
Thus, Defendant is not just asking this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling
on some alternate basis; rather, Defendant is actually asking this Court to use this
11

doctrine to reverse the trial court on a series of rulings that the court entered on this
very issue. This Court should not interpret that doctrine in that manner.
Second, even if available as an alternate ground for relief, Defendant's claim
still fails on its merits.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Under the analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972), four factors should ordinarily be considered in a speedy trial analysis:
the " [Ijength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530.5
In his brief, Defendant addresses three of these factors. See generally Aplee. Br.
10-19. Specifically, he addresses the length of the delay, his assertion of his speedy
trial right, and the alleged prejudice. See generally Aplee. Br. 10-19. But Defendant
fails to acknowledge, let alone address, the second factor: the reason for the delay.
And in this case, an examination of the record shows that the delay is directly
attributable to Defendant.
5

In his brief, Defendant suggests that "the State on appeal should be saddled
with the burden of establishing that these factors do not apply." Aplee Br. 15.
Defendant cites to no authority requiring the State to carry any burden in a speedy
trial analysis — particularly in a case like this one, where the trial court affirmatively
rejected the speedy trial claim below. Defendant's claim is therefore unsupported
and should not be accepted by this Court
12

When examining the reason for a delay, "different weights must be assigned
to the varying justifications and reasons." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,1328 (Utah
1986). When the record shows "deliberate attempt" by the government "to delay
the trial in order to hamper the defense," the delay is "weighted heavily against the
government." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. But when the record instead shows that the
delay was "caused by the defendant," the delay "will not be counted against the
State and will weigh against the Defendant" in a speedy trial analysis. State v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704,708 n.15 (Utah 1990). This not only includes intentional delays,
but also periods in which the defendant "either stipulated to or requested that he be
given more time to prepare his case." State v. Mejia, 2007 UT App 337,

112,172

P.3d 315.
In Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283 (2009), the Supreme Court recently
considered a case in which the trial was delayed by a number of factors, including
both continuances and motions, as well as by the defendant's conflicts with his
lawyers. Id. at 1287-89. On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to hold the
government accountable for delays that were attributable to "extensions and
continuances" to which the defendant or his counsel had stipulated. Id. at 1292.
And the Court also refused to hold the government accountable for delays that were
attributable to defendant's "strident, aggressive behavior" with respect to his
13

attorneys — including those periods in which he had moved to dismiss his attorneys
and replace them with new ones. Id. The Court thus noted that "a defendant's
deliberate attempt to disrupt proceedings" should "be weighted heavily against the
defendant." Id.
In this case, this record is replete with evidence that Defendant's "strident,
aggressive" behavior has contributed to the delay in bringing this case to trial. The
State originally filed charges on January 18, 2001. R. 3. In February 2001, the trial
court appointed Clayton Simms to represent him. R. 19. Defendant subsequently
filed a motion for a different attorney, demanding one who was "not prejudice[d]
towards" him. R. 29-34. In July 2001, John O'Connell was appointed in his stead.
R. 38. Defendant subsequently objected to O'Connell as well, demanding an
attorney who had never worked for the State, R. 43-55, and O'Connell subsequently
moved to withdraw, citing conflict with Defendant. R. 108. Following O'Connell's
withdrawal, Ed Wall was appointed.

R. 118-19. But Ed Wall subsequently

withdrew as well. R. 178. Heidi Buchi was then appointed, but she, too, withdrew
following conflicts with Defendant. R. 249,260-61. Following Buchi, Ed Wall was
reappointed, but he withdrew again, R. 256,267, and this was followed by periods
of representation by, among others, Barton Warren (R. 331,336), Patrick Anderson

14

(R. 366, 395), Delbert Walker (R. 367, 457), Heidi Buchi (R. 573, 576-77), Robin
Ljunberg (R. 585), and Susan Denhardt (R. 585, 946-49).
In addition to the delay caused by Defendant's conflicts with counsel, the
record is replete with time-consuming and repetitive pro se motions filed by
Defendant throughout these proceedings. Among others, Defendant has filed
motions to continue (R. 22,26), a motion for a personal recognizance bond (R. 20830), several motions to dismiss (R. 29-34, 43-55, 116-20, 152-53, 201-29, 607-19),
several motions for a bill of particulars (R. 29-34, 43-55, 61-68, 72-74, 284-300, 30207), several motions to declare the criminal non-support statute unconstitutional (R.
42-55,76-104), a request for a 120-day disposition (R. 70-74), several motions under
the IAD, as well as interlocutory appeals from the denials of those motions (R. 13251,167-68,175-77,184-87, 201-07), several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus (R.
233-38,270-84,338-66), a jurisdictional motion (R. 315-30), a motion to declare these
proceedings unconstitutional because of "today's unconstitutional government and
modernized state . . . after the 2002 Olympics'7 (R. 404-19), several motions to
disqualify the trial judge (R. 452-58, 553-59, 665-739), and civil lawsuits against his
attorneys and the trial judge (R. 673-84). As it currently stands, the record in this
case is over 1100 pages long.

15

As noted, Defendant ultimately raises this speedy trial claim in the context of
the alternate grounds for affirmance doctrine. But when reviewing alternate
grounds under this doctrine, appellate courts are "limited to the findings of fact
made by the trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light
of a new legal theory or alternate ground/ 7 Bailey, 2002 UT 58, f 20. And here, the
trial court specifically noted that Defendant had "filed hundreds of pages of
rambling, nonsensical pro se filings" throughout the course of these proceedings. R.
1141: 40.

In early 2009, the court entered a written ruling denying one of

Defendant's speedy trial motions in which the court specifically found that "during
the time period of 2006 through 2008, every continuance and delay in bringing this
matter to trial can be attributed to Defendant/' R. 750. And from the bench, the
court subsequently concluded that, "except for this competency issue, every single
one" of the delays in this case was caused by Defendant. R. 1141: 15; cf. State v.
Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 670 (Utah 1997) ("time spent evaluating competency may
not be considered in the speedy trial analysis").
Given these findings and the support found in the record, it is clear that
nothing remotely "oppressive or persecutorial" has occurred here.

State v.

Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547,548 (Utah 1978). Instead, the delay in bringing this case to
trial has been the result of Defendant's repeated abuse of the legal system, not any
16

"deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense." Barker, 407
U.S. at 531. Defendant's speedy trial claim is frivolous, and it should accordingly be
rejected.
V.
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE
25(B)(1)
Finally, Defendant suggests that dismissal was appropriate under rule
25(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows for dismissal where there
has been an ''unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial/ 7
Aplt. Br. 11.
Contrary to Defendant's claim, however, rule 25 is not at issue. Not only did
the trial court never invoke this rule, but it also repeatedly refused to dismiss this
prosecution on speedy trial grounds when it was raised below. R. 450,652, 749-50.
And while the trial court did ultimately cite to the delays as a reason for its
dismissal, it expressly refused to hold the State responsible for those delays. Rather,
as discussed above, the trial court determined that Defendant was responsible for
the non-competency delays in this case. R. 1141:15.
Thus, Defendant's interpretation of rule 25 would allow an obstreperous or
even insane defendant to force a dismissal of a criminal prosecution based on

17

nothing more than his dilatory tactics. This Court should not interpret this rule in
this manner.
In any event, even if applicable, rule 25 has not been satisfied. As noted, the
rule allows for dismissal where a delay has been either "unconstitutional" or
"unreasonable."

As noted above, however, the delay in this case was not

unconstitutional under the principles set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
And it was not unreasonable either, given that it was caused by Defendant's own
conduct. But if this Court concludes that the delay was unreasonable, the State
notes that it would be entitled to "further prosecution for the offense" under rule
25(d). Thus, if Defendant prevails on his claim of unreasonable delay, this Court
should reverse the dismissal with prejudice and allow the State to "fil[e] new
charges" as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal
with prejudice and remand for initiation of the competency restoration process.

18

, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

-^_D_
RYAN/y. TENNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

1

State of Utah,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee,

ORDER
Case No. 20090279-CA

v,
James Benjamin White,
Defendant, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant.

This matter is before the court on James Benjamin White's
motion to sever or motion to file an oversized brief.
To the extent that White's counsel suggests that he will
file a brief and an additional pro se brief, this court will not
accept a pro se brief when the party is represented by counsel.
See State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, 1 33, 143 P.3d 302.
White's counsel also asserts that he is required to assert
divergent and irreconcilable positions. Specifically, White's
counsel asserts that he must seek to affirm the district court's
order, whereas White seeks to challenge certain aspects of the
district court's order. If White's counsel should determine that
White's challenges to the district court's order may be moot or
frivolous, White's counsel may file an Anders brief with respect
to those issues.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that White's motion to
sever is denied. IT. IS FURTHER ORDERED that White's motion to
file an overlength brief is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
White's brief is due on or before March 15, 2010. White should
anticipate that no further extensions of time will be granted.
Dated this

""3a~y of March, 2010
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